According to so-called “thin” views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called “rich” views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies (...) in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable. (shrink)

Este trabajo despliega la pertenencia “específica” o “más propia” de ciertas maneras del ser (p.e. existencia, ser-a-la-mano) a ciertos entes, tema que Heidegger menciona, pero no profundiza. La exposición se articula en cuatro pasos. Primero, se aclara la confusa con-ceptualidad de las maneras del ser. Segundo, se indaga el vínculo entre las maneras del ser y los entes, considerando a ambos como fenómenos y mostrando en ello la imposibilidad de captar este vínculo y la consecuente pertenencia específica según un “subjetivismo” (...) u “objetivismo”. Tercero, se acredita la propuesta principal de esta investigación, a saber, el rasgo fenoménico, ni subjetivo ni objetivo, de la pertenencia específica de las maneras del ser a los entes y la posibilidad de su modificabilidad. Cuarto, se aborda el existir preteoré-tico del Dasein en cuanto el suelo analítico en que se explicita hermenéutico-fenomenológicamente la pertenencia específica y su modificabilidad. (shrink)

This is a review of Mind and Supermind. By KEITH FRANKISH. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp xiv + 255. Price £45.00 (US $75.00). ISBN 0521 812038 (hardback).

This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state–content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of “state–content error error,” i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that (...) characterize the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point in respect of Fodor's version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck's approach. The success of this objection in Heck's case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an unjustified commitment to a certain empirically suspect model of perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I (...) contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view. (shrink)

Esta investigación aborda el tema de la diferencia ontológica desde la perspectiva de las maneras del ser (ser-cómo), uno de los momentos constitutivos de la idea complejo-unitaria del ser. Tema y perspectiva se complementan recíprocamente. Primero, la diferencia ontológica posibilita evidenciar el fenómeno óntico de las maneras de ser del ente y el ontológico de las maneras del ser. Segundo, ambas maneras proveen una palpable visualización sobre los términos de la diferencia ontológica, desbrozando el terreno para distinguir al ser, no (...) sólo del ente, sino de la entidad, la cual está determinada unilateralmente por el ser-dado-delante (Vorhandenheit) en sentido amplísimo. (shrink)

In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which ‘non-voluntary’ just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging (...) is non-voluntary, I contend, because it is partially constituted by the exercise of a non-reason-governed skill. This skill, which I call ‘critical pop-out’, consists of an unreflective, often unconscious, ability to detect the kind of situations in which the reflective abilities that also partially constitute our acts of judging should be deployed. We are responsible for our judgments, I conclude, because in identifying such reflection-inviting situations, we reveal the kind of epistemic agents we are. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument (...) to work vis-à-vis these empirical results and offer two ways in which the accessibilist could meet the challenge posed by implicit biases. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and about the intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification. (shrink)

Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influential view in philosophy and cognitive science: the view that action-guiding vision is cognitively impenetrable. I argue, in response, that while there may very well be top–down causal influences on action-guiding vision, they should not be taken to be an instance (...) of cognitive penetration. Assuming otherwise is to assign a computational role to the influencing states that they cannot perform. Although questions about cognitive penetrability are ultimately empirical, the issues addressed in this paper are largely philosophical. The discussion here highlights an important set of considerations that help better understand the relations between cognition, vision, and action. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I (...) contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.En este artículo cuestiono la tesis de que la estructura representacional de las actitudes implícitas responsables del comportamiento implícitamente sesgado es proposicional—en lugar de asociacionista. De acuerdo con la propuesta criticada, si la conducta implícita sesgada puede ocasionalmente ser modulada por consideraciones lógicas y evidenciales, entonces la estructura de las actitudes implícitas responsables de esa conducta es proposicional. Cuestiono, en particular, la verdad de este condicional. Sostengo que la sensibilidad de las actitudes implícitas a consideraciones lógicas y evidenciales resulta ser un criterio inadecuado para establecer su verdadera estructura representacional. Consideraciones de otro tipo, que enfatizan los desafíos planteados por la injusticia social estructural que las actitudes implícitas reflejan, ofrecen, concluyo, un mejor apoyo para decidir esta cuestión a favor de una visión asociacionista. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to understand the concept of poetry in the broad context of Heidegger’s “early” thought, around 1919 and 1930. To that end, we seek to disclose a relation that in Heidegger remains implicit and in the secondary literature absent. This is the relation between poetry and the ways of Being (existence, ready-to-hand, present-at-hand, etc.). Since Heidegger did not explicitly thematize poetry in this broad context, the setup of this article consists of three main steps, in (...) which we make explicit the implicit ontological notion of Heidegger about poetry and, we shall argue, the ontological status of the poeticized. First, we distinguish between the theoretical and the pre-theoretical dimensions of existence, which enable us to explain that for Heidegger poetry is a pre-theoretical letting-see of the various entities that we encounter in the immediate everyday life that is mostly overlooked because of their “self-evident” and “obvious” presence. In this first step we argue that for Heidegger poetry is partially an explicit ontic letting-see. Second, we address the ways of Being in order to secure the systematic horizon for our interpretation regarding the relationship between the ways of Being and poetry. Third, we discuss that an indicative and non-conceptual letting-see of pre-theoretical ways of Being takes place in poetry through the respective poetized entity. In the second and third steps, we exhibit that according to Heidegger poetry results ultimately in an implicit ontological letting-see of the ways of Being. (shrink)

This paper has a two-fold goal. First, I defend the view that the prejudicial behaviour that results from implicit biases is best understood as a type of habitual action—as a harmful, yet deeply entrenched, passively acquired, socially relevant type of habit. Second, I explore how characterizing such implicitly biased behaviour as a habit aids our understanding of the responsibility we bear for it. As habits are ultimately susceptible of being controlled, agents ought to be held responsible for their implicit biased (...) actions. Yet, the blaming response should target agents only insofar as they have failed (while being able) to develop a particular kind of ability: the ability to spot the kind of situations that require the exercise of the relevant intellectual, moral, social, and prudential obligations. Being thus responsible, however, is consistent with the agent’s not being blameworthy. For the automaticity of the blamed agent’s implicitly biased behaviour makes it unintentional relative to intellectual, moral, social, and prudential values that she already cares about. (shrink)

El artículo se ocupa con la problemática metodológica referida al concepto ambiguo del «inicial y regularmente» en la ontología-fundamental de Heidegger. Por un lado, indica que el Dasein existe «inicial y regularmente» en su desempeño preteorético; por otro lado, que el Dasein existe «inicial y regularmente» en la impropiedad. En esta investigación se expondrá la imposibilidad metodológica de mostrar y acreditar hermenéutico-fenomenológicamente que el Dasein por lo general se desempeña impropiamente, primero porque implicaría una colocación acrítica ingenua en el punto (...) de partida mismo y, segundo, porque la fenomenología hermenéutica no se correlaciona a generalizaciones. (shrink)

Hans Blumenberg wrote, in an unpublished manuscript entitled Ein Betrug? / Der böse Dämon (UNF 532-534), that «the whole world and human intelligence were hidden beneath the earth, where the relics of the precursors of life rest». The German philosopher was not a palaeoanthropologist in the strict sense but dedicated much of his life to excavating in the ground, in search of replies to the great questions about the human condition. This paper is the result of a work compiling and (...) classifying a series of unpublished texts about palaeoanthropology to be found dotted throughout his Nachlaß. The aim is to show the interest that disciplines such as palaeoanthropology aroused in the German thinker, and that his understanding of the matter, reflected in part in his anthropological-philosophical theses, has not yet been systematised. (shrink)

It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, (...) but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all. (shrink)

This paper introduces the hypothesis that boredom may be a decisive factor in the social outbreak that took place in Chile in 2019. It is based on another hypothesis that postulates that boredom can become a political emotion capable of unleashing a revolution when it affects an entire community. The main objective of the work is to explain the theoretical, philosophical framework in which the second hypothesis is inscribed and to give reasons why, if this is true, it could be (...) applied to the specific case of Chile. In this sense, an unpublished definition of the concept of boredom is first outlined and the literature that describes boredom as a reactive and political emotion is examined. Then, the Chilean socio-political context of the last forty years is analyzed in search of isolatable factors that may be related to the experience of boredom. Lastly, an original line of research is proposed on which to work to test both hypotheses in a broader project that aims to be able to predict when a social system is on the verge of collapse because of boredom. (shrink)

Este trabajo describe la experiencia docente sobre el trabajo de campo experimental que se lleva a cabo desde la asignatura Nuevos Espacios Escenográficos del Máster de Producción Artística que se imparte en la Universitat Politècnica de València. La asignatura se fundamenta en las nuevas actitudes escénicas contemporáneas y el concepto de teatro expandido, siendo este el motivo de realizar la practica fuera del aula y colaborar entre instituciones para encontrar un espacio multidisciplinar donde desarrollar la propuesta que debe integrar la (...) vivencia e interacción con el público. (shrink)

Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic theories address semantic properties as properties of some other kind. The reductionistic flavor is unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is commendably unapologetic: "I suppose that sooner or later the physicists (...) will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in the face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else." Notice the shape of this explanatory project. Intentional properties will count as real in virtue of their identity with, or supervenience on, some set of lower-level physical properties. Fodor thus assumes, in effect, that the program of naturalization demands a higher-to-lower, top-to-bottom, kind of explanatory strategy. This paper addresses precisely that assumption, namely, that the non-semantic properties on which semantic properties depend, belong to what are intuitively lower levels of description than the intentional level itself. It also questions the higher-to-lower explanatory scheme associated with that assumption. My discussion of this topic draws on Robert Brandom's recent work and can be considered an analysis of Brandom's stance and its implications. The discussion should help to explain the general lack of progress in the project of naturalizing content. It should also help show why attempts to eliminate the normative vocabulary employed in specifying the practices that guide the use of a language are unlikely to succeed. I shall start by displaying the general order of explanation that characterizes typical naturalization projects, showing that even when a full reduction to physics is avoided, some important assumptions inherited from the explanatory model of physics remain. These include the demand for an array of causal explanations couched in terms of ultimate properties of the world, and the idea that such non-semantic properties should be constitutive of whatever semantic properties are in question. Extending Brandom's idea that the normativity of content is not reducible to physics, I shall argue that even such residual demands are inappropriate. More positively, I suggest that, despite the deep irreducibility of the normative dimension of content, we need not consider that dimension either primitive or inexplicable. Instead, such normative aspects can be unpacked by invoking a different, lower-to-higher, explanatory scheme in which the explanans includes higher level features such as skilled know-how and social frames of action. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S39-S41, March‐April 2022.

Both the early hermeneutics of facticity and the mature question of being have their starting point in the investigation of everyday life. Underlining Being and Time, we discuss two dimensions of the everyday life phenomenon, namely its «content» and «modal» sense. The relationship between both of them shows up as a dynamic tendency and an internal reference. On the basis of the distinction of the two-dimensional everyday life we deal with the problem of modal indifference, which is apparently closely connected (...) with the «content» sense of everyday life, in order to find out whether it could be a third way to execute existence besides authenticity and inauthenticity. We reject the plain correspondence between everyday life with modal indifference and inauthenticity, taking into account the thesis in Being and Timeabout the possibility of authentic liberating solicitude in the facticity of being together, whose analysis remains within the limits of everyday life. (shrink)

Nonconceptualists maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts a creature possesses. They claim that the content of these representational states is genuine content because it is subject to correctness conditions, but it is nonconceptual because the creature to which we attribute it need not possess any of the concepts involved in the specification of that content. Appeals to nonconceptual content have seemed especially useful in attempts to capture the representational properties of perceptual (...) experiences, the representational states of pre-linguistic children and non-human animals, the states of subpersonal visual information-processing systems, and the subdoxastic states involved in tacit knowledge of the grammar of a language. Nonconceptual content is also invoked in the explanation of concept possession, concept acquisition, sensorimotor behaviour, and in the analysis of the notion of self-consciousness. The notion of nonconceptual content plays an important role in many discussions about the relationships between perception and thought. (shrink)

Este trabajo despliega la pertenencia “específica” o “más propia” de ciertas maneras del ser (p.e. existencia, ser-a-la-mano) a ciertos entes, tema que Heidegger menciona, pero no profundiza. La exposición se articula en cuatro pasos. Primero, se aclara la confusa con-ceptualidad de las maneras del ser. Segundo, se indaga el vínculo entre las maneras del ser y los entes, considerando a ambos como fenómenos y mostrando en ello la imposibilidad de captar este vínculo y la consecuente pertenencia específica según un “subjetivismo” (...) u “objetivismo”. Tercero, se acredita la propuesta principal de esta investigación, a saber, el rasgo fenoménico, ni subjetivo ni objetivo, de la pertenencia específica de las maneras del ser a los entes y la posibilidad de su modificabilidad. Cuarto, se aborda el existir preteoré-tico del Dasein en cuanto el suelo analítico en que se explicita hermenéutico-fenomenológicamente la pertenencia específica y su modificabilidad. (shrink)

I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.

China is a country with a long-standing and rich history. This rich history is also expressed in its cultural, religious and philosophical diversity. One of China’s most prominent and influential philosophical strands is Daoism, which is still practiced today despite the political turmoil of the 20th century. It came into existence at roughly the same time as Confucianism. This paper focuses on a particular work of the Daoist canon, which at the same time is one of its most prominent ones: (...) The Dao De Jing by Laozi. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate in how far the virtues described in the Dao De Jing are applicable in a business context. Thereby this paper presents a first draft to turn the Dao De Jing into a “virtue ethics for business” by a thorough and comprehensive analysis of all 81 chapters based on drawing on eight different translations. (shrink)

This paper reports on an action research project about organizational change by a regional food bank in New York State’s southern tier. While the project team initially included a sociologist, food bank leadership and staff, it expanded to involve participants in food access programs and area college students. This paper combines findings from qualitative research about the food bank with findings generated through a collaborative inquiry about a ten-year process of organizational change. We ask how a regional food bank can (...) change its approach to address root causes of hunger. Acknowledging that narrow, pragmatic definitions of hunger promote charitable responses, our collaboration is grounded in structural understandings of poverty that refuse to blame the poor or treat poverty as an accident. Decades-long economic restructuring, deindustrialization and a rise in the service economy have resulted in growing inequality and long-term demand for “emergency” food in New York State. We outline critiques by scholars and practitioners of the emergency food regime. Description and analysis of the organizational change efforts of the Food Bank of the Southern Tier combine discourse analysis, collaborative inquiry, interviews, and participant observation. Discourse analysis of the agency’s strategic plans documents changes in aspirations, exposure to new epistemic communities and repertoires of actions. Interviews with participants evidence impacts of the organization’s advocacy and education programs on people with lived experience in poverty. Through a participatory process, we developed a collaborative chronology of phases of organizational change. Collaborative analysis of organizational changes demonstrates new definitions of the problem, a shift in service focus, changing outcomes and increased funding for advocacy. While recognizing substantial constraints, this project contributes to evidence that food banks may shift their discourse and practices beyond charity. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will (...) be mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how ascriptions. (shrink)

Esta investigación tiene por objetivo indagar el fenómeno de la huida (φυγή, fuga) tal como aparece en el libro IX, capítulo 4 de la Ética Nicomáquea de Aristóteles. La finalidad temática principal estriba en sacar a la luz que tanto su fundamentación teorética última, así como también su fundamento intrínseco radican en el principio metafísico del acto y potencia. Sobre la base de este principio metafísico mostramos que el “sí mismo” del cual el vicioso vive dividido en la huida consiste (...) en el entendimiento recto actual, revelándose este como el correlato preciso ante el cual huye el vicioso. Esta interpretación recupera la relevancia sistemática de la huida en el contexto de la amistad, ya que la huida hace visible concretamente la relación “amical” que el vicioso mantiene con sus prójimos, a quienes comprende tácitamente como medios-de-huida. (shrink)

Firms face mounting pressure to appoint ethical leaders who will avoid unnecessary risk, scandal and crisis. Alongside mounting evidence that narcissistic leaders place organizations at risk, there is a growing consensus that women are more ethical, transparent and risk-averse than men. We seek to interrogate these claims by analyzing whether narcissism is as prevalent among women CEOs as it is among men CEOs. We further analyze whether narcissistic women CEOs take the same types of risk as narcissistic men CEOs. Drawing (...) on social role and token theories, we test hypotheses related to gender differences in the prevalence and impact of CEO narcissism on firm-level practices. Using a unique dataset that includes a large sample of CEOs of S&P 1500 companies from 1992 through 2014, we create a narcissism composite score for each CEO based on their photograph size in the annual report, and their cash earnings and non-cash earnings relative to the next highest paid executive. We find that women CEOs are less likely to exhibit narcissistic personality traits compared to men CEOs. Furthermore, we find that gender moderates the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and our outcome variables of risk-taking and questionable behaviors. (shrink)

This study examines what Social Studies teachers can learn from Gay-Straight Alliances (GSA) in terms of the content that club members examine and the queer pedagogical approaches they employ. Findings reveal how educators can borrow students’ queer teaching and learning practices, and integrate their insights within Social Studies classrooms to disrupt (hetero/cis)normativity. Data derived from semi-structured interviews with five Canadian high school GSA members were analyzed using the queer theoretical and pedagogical insights of Britzman (1995. Educational Theory, 45(2), 151–165 ; (...) 1998. Lost subjects, contested objects: towards a psychoanalytic inquiry of learning. New York, NY: State University of New York Press), Sedgwick (1990/2008. Epistemology of the closet. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.), and Shlasko (2005 Equity & Excellence in Education, 38(2), 123–134). Three prominent themes emerged: (1) GSAs’ queer educative role compensated for a void in LGBTQ curricular content. Although LGBTQ-inclusive content was evident within some Social Studies, English, and French classes participants called for their teachers to integrate more content that disrupts homophobia and transphobia; (2) the personal characteristics of GSA members provide insight into how Social Studies educators can mirror students’ drive to learn about and challenge preconceived and (hetero/cis)normative assumptions/beliefs; and (3) GSA's queer educational approaches differed from the (hetero/cis)normative teaching and learning practices of their educators. GSA members engaged in student-led dialogue, and spearheaded queer initiatives and events to contest anti-LGBTQ attitudes at their schools. It is argued that when educators follow the lead of GSA members they may enhance their approach to and engagement with LGBTQ topics, and expand the queer pedagogical potential of the Social Studies. (shrink)

The principle of beneficence directs healthcare practitioners to promote patients’ well-being, ensuring that the patients’ best interests guide treatment decisions. Because there are a number of distinct theories of well-being that could lead to different conclusions about the patient’s good, a careful consideration of which account is best suited for use in the medical context is needed. While there has been some discussion of the differences between subjective and objective theories of well-being within the bioethics literature, less attention has been (...) given to the questions of what work a theory of well-being needs to do in bioethics and which standards of success ought to be used in selecting a theory of well-being for use in medicine. In this article, I argue that traditional theories of well-being developed in philosophy are not well suited to meet the needs of the medical context. For the principle of beneficence to be most useful, the underlying account of well-being should satisfy two conditions: first, it needs to lead to a concrete, action-guiding determination of the patient’s good; and, second, any recommendations it offers need to be justifiable to patients. Standard accounts of well-being have difficulty satisfying both conditions. Exploring the limitations of these theories when applied to treatment dilemmas helps point the way toward the development of an account of well-being better suited to healthcare. (shrink)

Through a hermeneutic-phenomenological reading we show the methodological commitments that support the approach of the interexistential theme, eminently in §26 of Being and Time and in constant consideration of its location and systematic dependence. This clarification allows, in positive contrast with the analysis of the world-environment of being-at-hand, to explain why the interexistential inquiry is set in motion within the primary daily horizon where the others are previously open, both mediately as intentional reference in the world-environment, as well as immediately (...) in the shared world. This initial approach in daily life is an inevitable methodological demand for the successful witnessing of the most basic being-with-another, thanks to which Heidegger manages to unveil the essential and a priori ontological structure of da-sein as being-with. (shrink)

En el contexto de la metafísica de Suárez este estudio pone al descubierto el fenómeno tácito de la “inquietud” anímica cuando el hombre se encuentra privado del conocimiento de las primeras causas que es accesible en la metafísica. La fundamentación argumentativa del fenómeno se sustenta sistemáticamente a partir de la revisión interpretativa que realiza Suárez en Disputationes Metaphysicae I, Sección VI, números 1-15 sobre la primera frase de la Metafísica de Aristóteles, a la que traduce y comprende según su verdadero (...) sentido como “es innato al hombre el apetito natural de ciencia” y, más específicamente, de metafísica, cuyo entrelazamiento constitutivo con el hombre se basa en la esencia humana en cuanto animal racional. Dado que la suprema perfección y felicidad humana aquí y ahora estriba en la realización de la metafísica, su privación conlleva y explica el afloramiento de una “inquietud” autorreferencial en el hombre. (shrink)

Mathematician. Philosopher. World traveler. Pythagoras was an intelligent and curious scholar and teacher. While he¿s best-known for the Pythagorean theorem, he shared ideas about numbers, animals, and many other areas of knowledge with his students. Since none of his writings were left behind, it¿s not always easy for historians to know what¿s true about Pythagoras and what may be legendary. What does seem apparent is that he was a vegetarian but not a trendy dresser. Some people saw him as godlike. (...) Others felt he made false claims about things. No matter what, Pythagoras¿s curiosity and willingness to grapple with complex issues have helped further the knowledge of mathematics and philosophy for thousands of years. (shrink)

La lectura de todo libro, de entrada, crea expectativas en el lector. Hay libros que consiguen despertar el interés a sabiendas de que han sido publicados gracias a la confluencia de diversos factores que prometen algo novedoso y de calidad. Este es el caso de la obra que nos ocupa, publicada por un Instituto que trabaja incansablemente por los Derechos Humanos, y que ha tenido a bien reconocer la obra y el compromiso humano de Raphael Lemkin, la persona que dio (...) su vida por dar nombre y luchar contra el infame delito del genocidio. A su vez, la edición corre a cargo de Donna–Lee Frieze, una profesora de la Universidad de Deakin, editora de la edición original en lengua inglesa de Totally Unoficial. The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin y del profesor de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Alfonso X el Sabio de Madrid, impecable traductor y editor de esta obra en español Por su parte, el prólogo de esta Autobiografía ha salido de la pluma de un Académico de la RAE, Antonio Muñoz Molina y lleva por título: «El dueño de una sola palabra». (shrink)

Podíamos leer una noticia en EL PAÏS el pasado 20 de marzo que nos dio el punto de partida para reflexionar sobre los fenómenos actuales que giran alrededor de los consumos excesivos de alcohol. En realidad poco importa la ciudad de la que se trata porque hechos similares los estamos viviendo desde hace tiempo en diversos y múltiples municipios. La noticia versaba sobre� "la posibilidad de habilitar una zona controlada y vigilada para acoger e botellón juvenil� acotar una zona en (...) el recinto portuario, en los aledaños de la carpa de la� para acoger el fenómeno juvenil. La iniciativa contó con el respaldo unánime de los asistentes a la reunión (entre ellos dos representantes de la Autoridad Portuaria de� y la subdelegada del Gobierno). Nadie puso ninguna objeción a la propuesta y se aprobó por unanimidad, señalan fuentes del Ayuntamiento. (shrink)

En este texto se analiza el papel de los derechos humanos en la fase actual de globalización, en cuanto herramientas de la libertad política. Su globalización, hasta ahora pervertida por una selección parcial e interesada de lo globalizable -ante todo, el sistema de libre mercado- es imprescindible para el funcionamiento democrático de la nueva organización mundial. Pero para que los derechos humanos sean útiles a tal menester, será necesario en primer lugar, reflexionar sobre los servicios que han prestado al desarrollo (...) y ahora a la globalización del capitalismo. En segundo lugar, es preciso adecuar el discurso de los derechos a las necesidades de quienes padecen los desequilibrios que origina la globalización y convertirlo realmente en un discurso emancipador. Una imprescindible contextualización de los contenidos y condiciones de ejercicio de los derechos -para lo que son imprescindibles derechos sociales y a lo que aún ayuda los Estados-nación- es el corolario de esta reflexión que finaliza con un ejemplo de contextualización del discurso de los derechos a través de los derechos de los consumidores. (shrink)

: La tarea se concentra en liberar una posibilidad prefigurada en el fenómeno del uno, a saber, la comprensión-interpretante impropia sobre el prójimo concreto. Esto requiere distinguir respecto al fenómeno del uno la doble direccionalidad de su sentido: se refiere tanto al quién impropio (uno-mismo) así como también a la pre-interpretación impropia en la que el dasein en-cada-caso-mío se interpreta a sí mismo y simultáneamente a sus prójimos. Junto con ello diferenciamos a los “otros” neutrales e indiferenciados en general, a (...) quienes el dasein en-cada-caso-mío también pertenece constitutivamente, del prójimo concreto. Sobre la base de esta doble diferenciación se logra el acceso teorético a la manera cómo el prójimo concreto es experimentado implícitamente a la luz de la pre-interpretación del uno-mismo, cuya exploración exegética se desenvuelve según el hilo conductor del fenómeno de la huida. (shrink)